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1. INTRODUCTION
Grouphealth insurance is an important topic for at least two
reasons. First, its quantitative importance is large and growing.
Second, the management, level, and form of group insurance are
increasingly a matter of concern for public policy, as are other
benefits often provided as fringe benefits. For example, the Nixon
administration proposed to use health insurance as a fringe benefit
as the main vehicle of its national health policy, and employee
pensions have recently been the subject of congressional investiga-
tion and legislation.
In one of the few papers that deal with fringe benefits (Lester,
1967), the author concludes
We lack a theory of the collective purchase of insurance-type benefits for
employees, either unilaterally by management or through union-
management negotiations. Without such a theory one is unable to give an
adequate explanation of...changes... inthe wage benefit mix in the
American economy.
In this paper, we shall attempt to outline such a theory and provide
some empirical tests of parts of it. Data deficiencies prevent a
73complete test of all implications of the theory. The critical element notions. A s
in this theory is that group insurance has institutional characteris- advantages o
tics similar to those of local public goods. There are two important though their
similarities: and Allison
1.The level of insurance coverage must, over broad categories stein (1973)
of employees, be equal for all, just as the level of the textbook tions, the su
local public good must be shared equally by all, visible benei
2.Persons not in the employee group receive no benefits, and The tax Ia
benefits can be lost or acquired by "migration" among Only certain
groups, just as for many local public goods.. S Thelevel of
These similarities make it possible to use some parts of the theory the
of local public goods to draw conclusions about group insurance, subject to th
But they also mean that a theory of fringe benefits will fall prey to But itis
the many unsettled theoretical problems of local public goods. maximum p0
There are differences as well, and they are equally instructive for by taic consid
the light they shed on the question of how analysis of the provision that on averi
of local public goods might be affected under similar arrangements. the actuarial
For example, one model we shall develop assumes that the large as
thelevel of group insurance, without group The reasoi
choice by employees, but with a view toward minimizing his labor have the san
costs. The analogous model for the theory of public goods might be tions require
a developer of a "new town" choosing the level of local public employees,




2.WHY FRINGE BENEFITS? Therudn
consideratio:
The first question to be answered is the most basic one—why what follow
fringe benefits exist. Why doesn't the employer pay the equivalent illustrate the
cash wage? Why should either the employer or employees, or-
ganized as a union, choose to receive some income in kind as health
insurance2 There are two elements in any answer. First, group
health insurance as a fringe benefit may be cheaper than individual
r purchases on the market. Second, the configuration of employee 3.FOR A
preferencesmay be such as to permit group purchasing of health
insurance to be relatively efficient. Model 1: ATIE Onlythe first rationale appears to be emphasized in the literature
on this subject. Rice, for example (1966), emphasized economies of The first m
group purchasing and tax advantages as the major rationales for classic
variations in fringe benefits in general, though he found that group ployees are
life and health insurance did not seem strongly related to the size at whi
empirical variables he could find to serve as proxies for these proaches ze
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notions. A similar explanation, with particular emphasis on the
advantages of group purchases, was given by Phelps (1973). Al-
though their purpose is descriptive rather than analytical, Feldstein
and Allison (1974) also emphasize tax advantages, whereas Feld-
stein (1973) cites, in addition to group purchasing and tax reduc-
tions, the supposed desire of unions and employers to provide
visible benefits.
The tax laws do impose some restrictions on group insurance.
Oniy certain kinds of insurance benefits qualify for tax exemption.
The level of those benefits must, ostensibly at least, be chosen by
the employer or through collective bargaining, rather than be
subject to the choice of each individual employee.
But itis obviously not true that all employee groups take
maximum possible insurance benefits. Even at a net price lowered
by tax considerations or the economies of group purchase, a net price
that on average may, according to Feldstein and Allison, be below
the actuarially fair price, group demand is not infinite, or even as
large as the tax laws permit.
The reason for this may be that employees do not necessarily all
have the same preferences. Both tax and technological considera-
tions require that group health insurance be uniform over groups of
employees, if not over all employees. If employees did have
identical preferences, a single level of benefits would be optimal
for all. This paper suggests that the dispersion of preferences may
help to explain the level of coverage actually chosen by. or for a
group.
The rudiments of a theory of fringe benefits must include
consideration of the problem of combining diverse preferences. In
what follows a series of simple models will be developed to
illustrate these points.
3. FORMAL MODELS
Model 1: A Tiebout-Type Model
The first model is intended to be analogous to Tiebout's (1956)
classic model of providing local public goods. We assume that em-
ployees are perfectly mobile, that firms are all at least as large as that
size at which the marginal advantage for group purchasing ap-
proaches zero,' and that workers are perfectly homogeneous with
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respect to the kind of labor they supply and to their expected medi- Suppose, foi
cal expenses, but differ in their attitudes toward risk. We shall also providing a
assume that the incidence of the cost of fringe benefits falls wholly that is not th
on the employees of the firm offering those benefits. Finally, we ceiving their
assume (1) that the number of firms is sufficiently "large" that a for whom
level of insurance corresponding to any level of employee prefer- money wage
ences can be provided, (2) that the number of employees with any ing their opi
set of preferences is at least twice the number needed to exhaust costs by pro




Employee Equilibrium the package
We assume a competitive market for labor. Thus, given any method employees,
of determining the level of group insurance premiums, it must be pre erences
true that, in every firm:
(1)
Union Choice
where MRP, is the marginal revenue product of labor, Y is labor
cost per employee, Y,. is the money wage, and iristhe premium for We assume
whatever level of insurance coverage k is chosen. In effect, Equa- (though the
tion (1) defines a supply curve of group insurance to the employee, equilibrium
From the set of all existing insurance-wage combinations satisfying equilibrium
(1), the employee will locate at one that maximizes his utility level of
function. One equili
Here, as in the remainder of the paper, we will consider two employees i
possible methods of determining the level of group insurance ance. For
benefits. Fringe benefits are sometimes determined collectively, with the me
by the set of present employees, usually through union bargaining, members, s
We call this method "union choice." Sometimes, however, fringe have just
benefits are determined by the employer, with a view toward are distrib
minimizing his labor cost. We first consider employer choice. equilibrium
There ma
equilibrium
Employer-Choice Equilibrium into homog
Given a distribution of employee preferences and assuming that employer-fo
optimally sized groups can always be created, employers may find it are
worthwhile to adjust the quantity of insurance they provide, group is not
Equilibrium therefore requires that no employer be able to create kinds of em
an excess supply of labor to his firm by altering his wage-fringe the types oi
benefit package. A sufficient condition for this is that there exists no The mediar
wage-fringe benefit package that could be offered by any firm that will the 1ev
is preferred by any worker to the package he is now receiving, higher
76 Goldstein and Pauly 77 Grouiir expected medi-
isk. We shall also
falls wholly
efits. Finally, we
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Suppose, for example, that a subset of all employers is initially
providing a subset of employees with a mix of wages and benefits
that is not the employees' optimal mix. All other employees are re-
ceiving their optimal package from their employers. The employees
for whom the level of coverage is not optimal will require a higher
money wage to work in those firms than they would for firms offer-
ing their optimal quantity. Employers will be able to reduce labor
costs by providing a package that is optimal to their employees.
Equilibrium therefore requires that every employee be in a firm
that provides a utility-maximizing bundle of the public good. For if
this were not so, some employer could reduce his labor cost by
offering such a bundle. Thus, in equilibrium all groups will offer
the package of insurance that maximizes that utility of all of their
employees, and all employees in any group will have identical
preferences with respect to insurance.
Union Choice
We assume that union groups are at least as large as the firm
(though they can be larger). We first show that the employer
equilibrium described above is also a union equilibrium. Union
equilibrium is assumed to require that each group (firm) choose a
level of coverage equal to the optimum of the median individual.
One equilibrium would clearly involve the distribution of
employees into groups with homogeneous preferences for insur-
ance. For such homogeneous groups, the optimum of the worker
with the median preference is also the optimum of all other group
members, so that no worker will be motivated to move. And we
have just shown that employer equilibrium occurs when employees
are distributed into homogeneous groups. Hence, employer
equilibrium is a union equilibrium.
There may be other union equilibria. Some differ from employer
equilibrium in that they involve different alternative configurations
into homogeneous groups, because a union group can exceed an
employer-formed group in size. There also are equilibria in which
groupsare not homogeneous. But any equilibrium in which any
group is not homogeneous is unstable. Suppose that there are two
kinds of employees and the optimal number of groups is two, but
the types of employees are evenly divided between the groups.
The median preferences in both groups will be the same, and so
will the levels of coverage. If one group should provide a slightly
higher level of coverage than the other group, it will attract one
77 Group Health Insurance as a Local Public Goodf I
typeof employee and repel the other. Equilibrium will be reestab- group could•
lished when groups are homogeneous. if it begins t
risks will
Group-Size Variable employer to
minimize lab
We now relax the assumption that employee group size must be bad risks. Li
optimal. This seems reasonable. 'For some industries, premiums insurance qu
appear to fall with group size up to sizes well in excess of the work
forces of some firms. One possible solution would be for employee
groups to combine for insurance purposes. Practical difficulties 'EmpiricLd Implica
may prevent employers from sanctioning this procedure, though we The purpose
might expect unions to do so. But if there is no combination, it equation of t
follows that wage costs per employee will initially have to be
k —k higher in small firms than in large ones, and that, moreover, the (x) +e
differencewill have to be still greater at high levels of coverage where k is th
than at low levels of coverage. As a consequence, we would not of independ
expect to find high levels of coverage as common among small firms conditions
as among large firms, under employer or union choice. Conversely, employees o
we should expect those employees with strong demands for insur- insurance pr
ance to be more likely to work for large finns. Prices of the outputs differ only
of industries characterized by small firms would rise relative to appropriate t
those of industries characterized by large firms until labor costs and Another ir




Assume now that not all workers have the same expected medical testing to se
expenses. Expected expenses can differ either because the mci- variables dif
dence of illness differs or because the quantity of care (medical
loss) consumed for any given illness differs.3 It is clear that in such a
situation bad risks may find it worthwhile to join groups of good
risks. Consequently, exclusionary devices may come into play. Model 2:
Such devices may take the form of medical examinations, or the A model in
characteristics of the job itself may be sufficient to exclude bad permit hom
risks. If adverse selection still remains, one might expect some of the world
individuals to be driven out of the group-purchase market a!- preferences
together, whereas others will pay a "weighted average" rate. The tion may re
relationship between quantity of insurance and level of risk is likely with respeci
to be positive. affect the de
It is also possible that equilibrium may not exist.4 For example, created for
suppose that because of an influx of bad risks the price of insurance executives i
risesso high that good risks no longer wish to buy insurance. They cumbersom€
will gather in a firm or group providing no insurance. But such a Second, the
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ance. But such a
group could provide insurance advantageously to its members. Yet
if it begins to do so, it will attract bad risks again and all the good
risks will again drop out.It may also be worthwhile for the
employer to provide less than the amount of insurance that would
minimize labor costs, since large quantities of insurance may attract
bad risks. Likewise, if the median worker is a good risk, limiting
insurance quantities may be worthwhile and may be stable.
Empirical Implications
The purpose of this paper is to estimate a demand-for-insurance
equation of the form
k =k(x) +e
where k is the fraction of expenses covered by insurance, x is a set
of independent variables, and e is a random error term. If the
conditions above hold, under either method of choice the
employees of a firm will be homogeneous with respect to their
insurance preferences; their characteristics,, part of the set x, will
differ only because of the random error e. Hence, it will be
appropriate to use mean values of x in the empirical specification.
Another implication of this model is that the method of choice
will not affect the quantity of insurance chosen. We will test for this
both by including the extent of unionization as an independent
variable in a regression using all observations and dividing the
observations into predominantly union and nonunion sets, and by
testing to see if the estimated coefficients on other independent
variables differ.
Model2: Imperfect Mobility
Amodel in which the variety of options is sufficiently large to
permit homogeneous groups of employees may not be descriptive
of the world. Workers in a single group may have heterogeneous
preferences for insurance for two reasons. First, efficient produc-
tion may require the hiring of labor forces that are heterogeneous
with respect to characteristics (e.g., education, sex), which might
affect the demand for insurance. Although separate groups might be
created for some kinds of employees (e.g., separate plans for
executives and production workers), it may be too costly or too
cumbersome to maintain separate plans for each worker type.
Second, the number of groups available to a set of employees may
79
IGroup Health Insurance as a Local Public Goodnot be large enough to permit the formation of homogeneous
groups of sufficient size to capture economies of scale or inhibit
adverse Whatever the reason, the result will be the
formation of insurance groups in-some of which it will be impossi-
ble for the quantity provided to be the optimum for all group
members.
Heterogeneous Labor
In what follows we analyze both cases. We show that, if groups
are heterogeneous for the first reason, employer equilibrium gen-
erally will exist but will differ from union equilibrium. In the
second case, we show that employer equilibrium is unlikely to
exist. We begin with the first case.
Suppose that there are two kinds of workers, A and B. Each kind
of worker provides a qualitatively different type of labor input; each
type has a quantitatively different identical-within-type demand for
health insurance. Both types of workers are useful in producing
output, and there is no perfect substitutability between types.
Hence, most firms will end up hiring some of each type of labor.
Because of supply and production considerations, we assume that
most firms hire more type-A than type-B employees when labor
costs per employee equal their relative marginal revenue products.
We also assume that different levels of insurance cannot be provided
to different types of employees.
Now suppose that the employer can provide health insurance. For
each employer, labor supply of each type of employee will be a
function of the money wage and the level of fringe benefits offered.
Assume that the incidence of fringe benefit payments falls wholly
on employees. Then, if their respective demand curves for insur-
ance are like DA and DB in Figure 1, A-type workers will optimally
want k*A units of insurance, and B-type workers, k*8 units.6 Each of
the optimal quantities is the quantity that would minimize labor
cost for that type of employee. At any other level of coverage, a firm
could offer a quantity close to k*, permit the employee to capture
some of the utility gain, and recoup the remainder in the form of
lower wages.
But the optimal level of coverage for a firm consisting of both
types of employees requires a tradeoff between the optimums of
both groups. Suppose that firm i's employment of each labor type,
and L81, is given. Its wage bill is therefore:
W =CALA1 +C8L81
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whereCA is the labor cost per type-A employee and C8, the labor
cost per type-B employee.
Assume that the wage package available to type-f employees at
other firms is k0). Hours of work are fixed. Workers have utility
functions of the form:
(2)U=U(w,k)
For every type-f employee for firm i, equilibrium requires that
Iffirmiwishes to minimize its labor costs,
it will set the wage rate of type-J workers, for a given k' = so
that:
(3) k1 ) = ko)
Suppose that the firm is considering offering an increment in k that
has a premium cost ir. The change in the money wage that permits
(3) to continue to hold is given by that decrease in money wages
that holds utility constant at the level indicated in (3), or:7
Hence, the change in total labor cost per employee is:
since the firm must pay the premium, ir. Minimizing total labor cost





LA I —irI= I —IT I Since the c
L J L U?.8J equallyto
equivalent
Thus cost-minimizing equilibrium requires equalizing weighted- summed
average marginal labor cost per employee of each type. Changes in The prec
k'beyondthe optimum of type-B workers require an increase in differ, and
their wages, but this increase may be more than offset by the marginal
decrease in the wages of type-A workers. In terms of Figure 1, average
increments in coverage beyondrequirean increase in type-B systematica
employees' wages equal to the difference between DB and IT;e.g., former is cc
measured by distance GF at quantity k* + &If,for example, employees
LBGF <L4GH, then k should be increased further, whereas if unions mig
L8GF =LAGH,k* + 6isthe cost-minimizing level of the fringe median uni
benefit. than the av
Union equilibrium, on the other hand, simply requires that the This may
quantity chosen equal the optimum of the individual with median not all won
preferences. Since the median worker is a type-A employee, tive econo
union equilibrium requires equating type-A marginal rates of package ha
substitution with the premium to be charged per unit of in- women and
surance. The employer has an incentive to consider all workers' have low d
preferences in a way that the union does not. If type-A (union- workers wi
dominant) workers generally prefer more insurance than type-B less likely t
workers, unions will prefer different quantities of insurance than which unk
nonunionized firms. Moreover, the greater the number of type-B demand
employees, as long as it is less than half of the total number of level of coy
workers, the greater will be the difference between employer and choice on t
union choice.
In particular, suppose that type-A employees demand larger Homogeneous L
quantities of insurance than do type-B employees. Unions will We now
cater to the demands of type-A employees. Those firms that provide but in wh larger quantities of insurance will tend to be unionized. The homogene exceptions would be (1) those firms containing only one type of supply and employee and (2) those firms with more type-B than type-A insurance employees. With more kinds of employees, it becomes more
t differences difficult to predict the direction of the union effect. In general, that tax C( union choice will differ to the extent that the marginal rate of 1 numoer0
substitution of the median worker differs from a weighted average ermit for
of the marginal rates of substitution of all marginal workers. preference
It is worth mentioning that employer equilibrium is also Pareto function of
optimal, whereas union equilibrium is not. For if we rearrange offers





(6c) LA +LB =(LA +L8)ir
Sincethe cost of a unit of the "public good" insurance provided
equally to all is given by the term on the right, Equation (6c) is
equivalent to the Samuelson optimality condition, equating
summed marginal rates of substitution with marginal cost.8
The preceding model shows that union and employer choice may
differ, and that those differences depend on a comparison of the
marginal benefit of health insurance to the median voter with the
average marginal benefit of all marginal workers. Unions will
systematically provide more insurance, ceteris paribus, if the
former is consistently greater than the latter. If we assume that all
employees are equally likely to be marginal, one reason why
unions might be expected to provide more insurance is that the
median union voter will typically have a higher marginal benefit
than the average worker's marginal benefit.
This may occur for two reasons. First, even in unionized firms,
not all workers are union members, and yet reasons of administra-
tive economy may well require them to share the insurance
package bargained by the union. Those nonmembers tend to be
women and low-income and young male workers, all of whom will
have low demands for insurance. In addition, it is likely that those
workers with low marginal benefits who are union members are
less likely to vote in union elections. The constituency of voters to
which union leaders respond will therefore be one with a high
demand for insurance, whereas the employer, if he chooses the
level of coverage, will have an incentive to consider the effect of his
choice on the wages he must pay all workers.
Homogeneous Labor
We now turn to the second case, in which labor is homogeneous
but in which there are not "enough" groups. Workers are
homogeneous with respect to the amount and type of labor they
supply and have different preferences with respect to the level of
insurance they prefer. These differences might result both from
differences in demands at equal prices and from the different prices
that tax considerations pose for different income groups. The
number of employment opportunities is not sufficiently large to
permit formation of homogeneous groups for every employee
preference. The supply of labor to any firm, therefore, becomes a
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In order for equilibrium to exist in this market, the quantity of The secon
insurance being provided to the members of a group must be an able to make
equilibrium under the choice rule being used for that set of the same nui
individuals. In addition, given the quantity of insurance chosen, is L, this me
each firm or group must be an equilibrium location for the members hold must
of the group; employee equilibrium must prevail.
9 — Inemployee equilibrium, no employee may confront a wager ( a) (wi,=
fringebenefit package in some other firm that he prefers to the one and
he is now receiving. The characteristics of this equilibrium depend
'9b) +kt on whether or not the employer can adjust the money wage of each
W IT
employee individually. If he cannot, but must (for practical or Conditions
institutional reasons) pay the same money wage to each employee, obtain as mi
employee equilibrium would require that the employee at the than they ar
margin be indifferent between the wage-insurance package of this labor cost th
employer and that of his next best alternative, number
Call 1k=kworker i's reservation wage for working at firmj. usual way 1
This is the minimum money wage at which, given the level of product of 1
insurance coverage, worker i would be willing to work for firm To show
Call1k =the actual money wage being paid by firm j. For satisfied sir
simplicity, the level of insurance coverage will be suppressed in supply of la
what follows. Obviously, if w,j the worker will work for firmj, respect to t
and vice versa. Obviously, too, w,,, depends on worker i's alternative benefits is
opportunities. Thus, employee equilibrium is characterized by: work. At th
(7) w,,< = offeredby i
will bring t
for all workers who work at any firmj. ployeesato
Equilibrium with respect to the employer's insurance decision the employ
requires two conditions to apply. First, no firm can alter its labor distributioi
cost per employee by slight changes in its level of coverage. f(m1) the fr
Assume that each firm believes that other firms' levels of coverage margin an(
will not change in response to changes in its level of coverage. Let To make
ir be the cost per unit of insurance k. If a unit change in coverage is happen on!
made, a worker who formerly did not do so will choose to work for or if it is




Conversely, a worker who works for finnj will leave if, and only if: to work at
their optir
(8b) — IT — only point
u,', This
Equilibrium requires that the number of workers for which (8a) lem, and
holds equal exactly the number of workers for which (8b) holds. foregoing
84 Goldsteinand Pauly 85
IGroThe second employer equilibrium condition is that no firm be
able to make a nonmarginal change in coverage such that it can hire
the same number of employees at a lower labor cost. If this number
is L, this means that the_number of workers for which (9a) and (9b)




Conditions 9 require that there be no set of L workers who can
obtain as much as or more utility from hypothetical package (w,k)
than they are now getting, if the hypothetical package has a lower
labor cost than the package they are presently receiving. The actual
number of workers L to be hired would then be determined in the
usual way by equating marginal factor cost to marginal revenue
product of labor.
To show that the two conditions (8) and (9) are unlikely to be
satisfied simultaneously, let us begin with the case in which the
supply of labor to the market as a whole is perfectly inelastic with
respect to the real wage. The only function of the level of fringe
benefits is then to determine for which employer a worker will
work. At the margin, given any set of levels of insurance k being
offered by a given number of firms,=we,. Aslight alteration ink
will bring the level of coverage closer to the optimums of the em-
ployees at one margin and move it further away from the optimums of
the the other margin. Suppose that we have a frequency
distribution of the optimums of workers in the labor market. Call
f(m1) the frequency of optimums of employees who are at the one
margin and f(m2) the frequency of employees at the other margin.
To make (8a) =(8b)therefore requires that f(m1) =f(m2).This can
happen only if the distribution contains a mode between m1 and m2,
or if it is rectangular over the interval m1 to m2. For unimodal
distributions, the only level of coverage satisfying marginal
equilibrium occurs at a mode.
However, if all firms offer the level of coverage at the mode,
persons whose optimums are not close to the mode will be willing
to work at lower wages for firms that offer levels of coverage nearer
their optimums. Hence, conditions (9) may well not hold. If the
only points that satisfy (8) do not satisfy (9), no equilibrium exists.
This problem is formally similar to Hotelling's locational prob-
lem, and a brief geometric exposition may help to explain the
foregoing discussion and to make the similarity clear. It is assumed
85 Group Health Insurance as a Local Public Good
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'hich (8b) holds.that, marginal labor cost held constant, workers will choose to work
for the firm whose level of k is closest to their optimum. If five firms
offered the levels of coverage k1 through k5, respectively, the
margins would be at the point indicated by the dashed lines in
Figure 2. For simplicity, these positions have been chosen so that
each firm has the same number of employees (i.e., the integrals
between the margins are the same). It is apparent that these firms
are not in marginal equilibrium; movements toward the mode gain
more workers than they lose for all firms except firm 3. But if all
firms locate at the mode, dividing the total labor supply into five
parts, it is obvious that a firm that took up, say, position k2 could
attract an excess supply of labor, since it would lure all the workers
from the left tail up to the margin m. Hence, marginal and global
equilibrium cannot coexist.
Although it will not be proved here, it can be shown that if the
labor supply is not perfectly inelastic with respect to the real wage,
equilibrium by chance may occur even in situations with "large"
unimodal distributions. But such occurrences would not be particu-
larly likely.
It is worth pointing out that these conclusions about the nonexis-
tence of equilibrium can be generalized to the local public goods
case as well. Questions are raised about the existence of equilibrium
if property owners are thought of as choosing the level of local
public goods to maximize rents. For the purpose of characterizing
reality, the foregoing model is somewhat unsatisfactory.
Union equilibrium obviously requires that the employees be in
equilibrium and that the employer be in equilibrium with respect
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coverage and the supply of labor function. The level of insurance
coverage, however, isset, at the level of the optimum of the
individual with median preferences in the present group of work-
ers.
Two observations are relevant here. First, it is clear that there can
be multiple equilibria. It may be, for example, that every
employee-employer equilibrium is also the optimum of the indi-
vidual with median preferences. But second, itis also clearly
possible that no equilibrium exists. Suppose that every individual's
utility depends in a linear way on the difference between his
optimum and the level of coverage chosen for the group. Suppose
that the distribution of individual optimums is as in Figure 3.
Finally, suppose that there are three firms.
The conditions for equilibrium are the following, where f(x) is
the distribution of optimum quantities and it is assumed that the
wage costs per worker are the same in all firms:
(10)Employeeequilibriumm,d, =d1m2
m2d2
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FIGURE 3
1(x) = I (k*)
m1d1m2d2m3The positions of d and m in Figure 3 are drawn to satisfy these Why conditions. However, it is also clear from that figure that the
number of employees in each firm is not equal. But at equal wage Suppose th
cost per employee, each firm will want to hire the same number of type-B emi
employees. Hence, no equilibrium exists. If the marginal wage cost Figure 4,
peremployee differs across firms (because elasticities of supply noncontribi
differ), firms may not all want to have the same size labor forces. The total
But whatever pattern they choose, it need not correspond with the JHG.
numbers that satisfy (10) and The line
insurance.
group plan
Empirical Implications plan, or an
surance.
Without a robust characterization of equilibrium, it is difficult to When is
specify a priori what one would expect to find from empirical data. Such a ph
What we can say is that under either equilibrium notion presented type-A pei
above, the level of coverage an employer would choose will tend to relatively
be related more to the characteristics of all employees in a given welfare lo
labor market thantothecharacteristicsof thoseparticular relatively I
employees he hires, whereas union choice will tend to be related are widel)
only to characteristics of the median person. Insofar as the
employer is in marginal equilibrium, what will be relevant are
the characteristics of his marginal employees. Union choice, on the Optmial Emplc





Upto this point,only choice available to union or employers is
to decide how much tax-free fringe benefit to offer. But many firms
have so-called contributory plans, in which the employer does not
"pay" the entire health insurance premium. The employees pay all
or part of the premium as an explicit and voluntary payroll deduc-
tion. The critical differences are that those employees who choose
not to participate in the plan can retain their share of the premium
and that the employee's share is taxed as ordinary income.
We first show, in the context of the two-employee-types model,
how a contributory plan can be preferred by an employer to a
noncontributory plan. We also show that a union will in general not
choose a contributory plan. Then we indicate how the employer
chooses the optimal share-coverage combination. For simplicity,
we consider a model in which the same contributory share applies
to all units of coverage.
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I 89 GWhy ContributoryPlans?
Suppose that a firm has exactly twice as many type-A employees as
type-B employees and that their demand curves are as shown in
Figure 4, where rr is the unit premium for group insurance. The
noncontributory equilibrium package is at where GH =211F.
Thetotal welfare loss suffered by a type-B person is given by area
JHG.
The line ir' represents the cost to type-B employees for individual
insurance. Type-B employees will be better off dropping out of the
group plan if the effects of extra premium costs for an individual
plan, or area Jrrir'M, are less than the welfare loss from group in-
surance.
When is an employer more likely to offer a contributory plan?
Such a plan is more likely to materialize if the costs imposed on
type-A persons are low, i.e., if their marginal income tax rate is
relatively low. It is also more likely to be advantageous if the
welfare loss of type-B persons under a noncontributory plan is
relatively high, which tends to occur if the optimums of both groups
are widely separated.
Optimal Employee Share
In the two-type model, a contributory plan will make all
employees who take the maximum amount of insurance worse off,
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FIGURE 4premium to income taxation. Hence, a noncontributory plan can
benefit type-B workers only if they are induced to opt out of the
group insurance plan. Then they save the employer the total
amount of the premium that would have been paid for them.
Suppose that a contributory plan is introduced, with a given
employer share s. There are two equilibria possible. On the one
hand, if type-B employees do not drop out, the optimal k is
analyzed as in the noncontributory case. On the other hand, if
type-B employees do drop out, k is set at the optimum of type-A
individuals, and the money wages of type-B workers are increased
to make up for the loss of insurance. If they are worse off with
insurance than without it, the employer would want to setat
such a level that 0) = and set such that
UA{[tvA— t(1 jr], }= (wAo,k0). Noticethat will
differ fromsince the increase in the fraction of premium that is
taxable income raisesthe net price of insurance to type-A
employees. Clearly, iSminimized if s is as large as possible, and
does not vary with s once type-B employees have dropped out.
Hence, the optimal s would appear to be the largest s at which
opting out is legal.
But this assumes that type-B workers will indeed opt out. From
the viewpoint of any individual worker, his money wage will not
depend on whether he chooses insurance or not (for if it did, the
employer payment would not be tax free). He will not be likely to
opt out at a high s, since his perceived benefit from doing so is
(1 —s)kir,whereas his perceived cost is the loss of the entire
insurance package icThe employer may need to lower s much
below 1 to induce type-B employees to opt out. The cost of
providing this inducement is the extra tax on the income of type-A
workers.
The type-B worker's perceived utility level, if he opts out, is
+ (1 — 01, and he compares it to U8 (wr, where
is the optimal mixed equilibrium. (We assume here that the firm
does not "force" him out by providing, say,units, although the
analysis would be roughly similar.) The firm's problem is to choose
the largest s such that opting out occurs. The lower the evaluation
the worker puts on theunits of insurance (i.e., the greater the
welfare loss he bears at ku), the higher this s can be, as long as s is
less than 1.
There is a fundamental difference in the effect of worker charac-
teristics on premiums. For noncontributory insurance, the lower
B's demand relative to A's demand, the lowerand hence the
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the higher will be optimal s. If the B's do not participate,can be
higher. Premiums can increase, decrease, or be unaffected by
changes in variables related to B's demand.
Unions and Contributory Plans
It would appear that a union should never choose a contributory
plan, for the optimum of the median worker always involves a
noncontributory (fully tax free) plan providing his optimal level of
coverage. Of course, if the employer has some influence in the
decision, or if vote-trading or consideration of the effect of worker
group characteristics induces the union to consider the preferences
of other employees, unions may be associated with contributory
plans. But in general we should expect unions to be less likely to
have contributory plans.
General Equilibrium
The world that we will be analyzing empirically is one in which
group insurance is provided in many firms and the quantity is
sometimes chosen by unions and sometimes by employers. The
supply curve of labor to a particular firm depends both on the wage-
insurance package of that firm and also on that of all other firms. But,
assuming that a general equilibrium exists, the partial equilibrium
conditions outlined above must be satisfied for every firm, the
particular set of conditions depending on whether the employer
or the employee chooses the quantity. In addition, it requires that
wage cost per employee be equated across firms. This means that
those firms which are prevented from offering the labor-cost
minimizing insurance package will sustain losses and will go out of
business. If they are concentrated in particular industries, and if
new nonunionized firms cannot be formed, average firm size must
shrink until marginal products are equalized.
Empirical Specification
The empirical models of union choice that we test are similar to
studies of the demand for local public goods by Borcherding and
Deacon (1972) and by Bergstrom and Goodman (1973). Both of
these studies rely on the proposition that, in a majority rule model,
the group choice is identical with the optimum of the individual
with median preferences. Coupled with the assumption (implicit in
Borcherding and Deacon and explicit in Bergstrom and Goodman)
91 Group Health Insurance as a Local Public Goodthat the median quantity is demanded by the citizen with the industries ii
median income, they provide an empirical estimate of the price and choosing
income elasticities of demand as well as an estimate of a "crowd- ently from u
ing" or "(dis)economy of scale" parameter. be
There are three major empirical variables in both of these respond di
studies. Both use median income. In addition, quantity of the employee
public good is regressed on a measure of the price of the public sponds to &
good and the number of persons in the sharing group. the mean i
We have mentioned above that for group insurance, the loading is insurance
likely to vary inversely with group size up to some limit. The extent median inc
to which it does so would correspond to the "crowding" notion. relationship
Unfortunately, it does not appear that we will be able to use an charactenst
independent measure of price. Insurance is produced in a national weaker.
market, so there seems to be no reason to expect prices for a given In additi
group size to differ across areas or industries. And it seems premiums i
reasonable to assume that all employees pay equal shares of the more likely
total cost, so "tax shares" will not differ. One could argue that want less
differential concentrations of bad risks might affect the price paid bers whose
by a representative median individual, but to get a measure of the employees
actual price variation we need to know by how much, e.g., a larger larger fami
proportion of high-risk blacks raises the premium per individual for unionS cho
a given level of coverage. "union lea
Thus we are limited to estimating the effects on quantity of
insurance demanded of income and group size alone. Data limita-
tions will require us to work with average pay, rather than median
income. A further difficulty is that we do not have a measure of k,
the fraction covered by insurance. Instead, we get a measure of total 5. THEDA1
premiums.This means that, since we do not know price, we are
B estimating an expenditure equation rat er than a emand equation. m to er And since total premiums depend on expected losses as well as on lta used the fraction of those losses covered by insurance, we either need to 1 eStaoLiSflfll find a way of removing influences on losses in order to determine miishes be
what affects choice of coverage for a given loss or need to interpret sks whet.l our coefficients as including both effects. After the enipirical results
th 01
arepresented, some illustrative calculations directed at removing e /
plans aisti these effects will be presented. 11 L ficaiiy,me
a health,ii
(or plans)
4.DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UNION CHOICE nately,th
AND EMPLOYER CHOICE welfarep
together.
We will be able to estimate separate demand relationships for includes
industries in which the choice method is primarily by unions and region in
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y by unions and
industries in which it seems reasonable to think of the employer as
choosing insurance. The hypothesis that employers choose differ-
ently from unions for a given set of employee characteristics might
be extended to include the premise that employers are likely to
respond differently from unions to differences in the set of
employee characteristics. In particular, since the employer re-
sponds to characteristics of the marginal worker, we would expect
the mean income to have less of an effect on employer-chosen
insurance than it does on union-chosen insurance. For mean and
median incomes are likely to be highly correlated, whereas the
relationship between mean income and the income and other
characteristics of the marginal worker is likely to be relatively
weaker.
In addition, the finding that union choice leads to larger total
premiums. is consistent with the notion that the union's choice is
more likely to ignore the strong preferences of those who would
want less insurance. Finally, to the extent that those union mem-
bers whose preferences. are relevant tend to be higher risks than
employees in general (because they tend to be older and have
larger families or higher incomes), we would also expect to find
unions choosing higher levels of health insurance. No recourse to a
"union leader" or "visibility" argument is necessary.
5. THEDATA
TheBureau of Labor statistics periodically conducts a survey of
employer expenditures for supplementary compensation.'° The
data used in this study are drawn from a 1971 survey of 3,772
establishments across the United States. The questionnaire distin-
guishes between the records of office and nonoffice employees and
asks whether union-management agreements covered a majority of
either group of workers. The questions concerning fringe benefit
plans distinguish among health, life, and accident insurance. Speci-
fically, the questionnaire asks whether or not an establishment had
a health, life, or accident insurance plan, and if so whether the plan
(or plans) was (were) noncontributory or contributory. Unfortu-
nately, the question about employer expenditures for these private
welfare plans asked only for the total expenditure on all plans
together. Other information drawn from the survey for this study
includes gross annual payroll, total employment, the SIC code, the
region in which the establishment was located, and a further geo-
GroupHealth Insurance as a Local Public Goodgraphical code distinguishing metropolitan from nonmetropolitan The bina
locations." For purposes of this study, annual employer expendi- of Appendi
tures per worker for health, life, and accident insurance and total characteris
payroll per worker were calculated separately for the office and be





6.THE EMPIRICAL WORK expectedt
Weare unable to directly examine all the distinctions suggested by discussed
the theory between employer-choice and union-choice models. Finally,
Ideally, we would need data on the characteristics of workers in group is ii
eachestablishment. We would then attempt to show that premiums account for
in the employer-choice model respond to selected measures of ceteris pat
dispersion of the various employee characteristics, whereas in the There a
union-choice model premiums would be expected to be related the regres
only to selected characteristics of the median worker. nonoffice
The data restrict us considerably since there is no information on would be
the distribution of characteristics of the workers. So the model to be covered b
estimated is basically of the following form: sometimes
7 onegroup
Premium =a+ b pay + c(size of group) + d(size of group)2 +gj group aloi
1=1
32 relevant
(sevenbinary variables representing the types of plans) + the pay of
applies to (thirty-two binary variables representing SIC codes) + s (binary size of th variable for the South) + t (binary variable for unionization) + V(bi-
nary variable for office worker group). sample th
which the The variables will be discussed individually. The "pay" variable which it i is simply the annual wage and salary payment per worker. The pooled. T "size" variable is used as a proxy variable for the price of the plan.
The price per unit .of group insurance is expected to decline with these firm
the size of the group. The quadratic term, "(size)2," is used to pick In App
up any nonlinearity between size and price per unit of group regressiOt
insurance, expected,
As mentioned, the survey asks about health, life, and accident elasticity
insurance plans. Since the size of the premium is related to the tively reb
combination of plans offered, we must control for this variation, quadratic
There are twenty-six possible combinations of plans. It was felt that located ii
the accident insurance component of fringe benefit payments was pan bus, I
likely to be insignificant, and as a result this component was types of
ignored in the empirical work. The eight possible combinations of significati
plans are presented in Table 1 of Appendix 1. Finally, t
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The binary variables for the SIC codes are presented in Table 2
of Appendix 1. These are designed to capture the industry-specific
characteristics that might affect the size of the premium. They will
be discussed further below.
The binary variable for location in the South is entered to control
for the lower costs of medical services in the South, and a negative
sign for the coefficient of this variable is expected.
The union variable takes the value of 1if the group is
covered by a collective bargaining agreement, and premiums are
expected to be positively related to this variable for reasons
discussed above.
Finally, there is the binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the
group is made up of office workers. This is a control variable to
account for possible different attitudes toward these fringe benefits,
ceteris paribus, on the part of office workers.
There are several possible samples that can be used to calculate
the regression above. The decision unit could be all office and
nonoffice groups in the sample considered individually. This
would be reasonable if office and nonoffice groups were always
covered by their own separate plans. If the two groups were
sometimes covered by the same plan, then using simply the pay of
one group in an establishment to explain the premium for that
group alone would be misleading. The pay figure that would be
relevant would be some combination of the pay of this group and
the pay of the other group in the establishment. A similar argument
applies to the union variable. As for the size variable, clearly the
size of, the entire insurance group is the desired variable. The
sample that will be used therefore includes only those firms for
which the office and nonoffice groups have different plans, and for
which it is legitimate to conclude that employee groups were not
pooled. The decision units are the office and nonoffice groups of
these firms.'2
In Appendix 2, Table 1, we summarize the results of the initial
regression, with union and nonunion observations pooled. As
expected, premiums are positively related to pay, with the income
elasticity of demand at the mean being 0.64. Premiums are posi-
tively related to the size of the group, but negatively related to the
quadratic term for size as hypothesized. If the establishment is
located in the South, the premium per worker is $28 less, ceteris
paribas, than outside the South. The sets of binary variables for
types of plans and industry classification are often statistically
significant, whereas the binary variable for office workers is
Finally, the union variable is positively related to premiums as
95 Group Health Insurance as a Local Public Goodhypothesized. The presence of a union-management agreement establishme
adds $81 to the premium per worker, ceteri's paribus. cal section.
We have demonstrated thus far that unions do indeed make a It is diffic
difference in the premium and coverage per worker. The theoreti- contributor)
cal discussion above, however, suggested that unionized groups act ized groups,
differently from nonunionized groups in making a decision on will have
premiums. The sample was subdivided into unionized and can be sug
nonunionized groups, and the same model was tested on each income eta
subgroup (with the exclusion, now, of the union variable, of course). subsample
An F test rejected the hypothesis of equality between the sets of
coefficients in the two regressions at the 1 per cent level of ing prefere
significance. tributory p1
In Appendix 2, Tables 2 and 3, we present the regression results provide too
for unionized groups and for nonunionized groups, respectively, one can opt
The most important difference between the two groups is in the has much n
income elasticity of demand for premiums. For the unionized out. The le'
groups, the elasticity is now 0.87, whereas for the nonunionized contributor
group it is 0.45. Of significance also is the fact that the coefficient of
size is statistically insignificant in the nonunion results, whereas
the coefficient of the quadratic term is insignificant in both cases.'4
Furthermore, in the nonunion results, the binary variable for office 7.ILLUS1
workersis now significant and positive. Being in an office group, ANDIN ceteris paribus, adds $86 to the premium. INSURA
Thesample can be further subdivided on the basis of type of
plan. In Appendix 3, Tables 1 through 4, we present the results of The elastic
regressions calculated for unionized establishments with noncon- of the resi
tributory plans, unionized establishments with contributory plans, estimate ti
nonunionized establishments with noncontributory plans, and introduce
nonunionized establishments with contributory For Assume
unionized establishments with noncontributory plans, the income coverage.
elasticity of demand for premiums is 0.90; for nonunionized estab- of the grot
lishments with noncontributory plans, only 0.17. For unionized
establishments with contributory plans, the income elasticity of (12) 7uITS= (71k
demand for premiums is 0.67; for nonunionized establishments
with contributory plans, the figure is 0.70. To discuss these re- where Tlk.
sults further, it is useful to briefly present some other results of pnce w
choice of plan. rate at wh
to estimat In Appendix 4, results are presented for a regression using only Similar1 groups with plans in which the dependent variable is a binary as' variable that takes the value of 1if the establishment has a
noncontributory welfare plan, and 0 if the plan was contributory.'6 (13)*(1 —
Ceterisparibus, unionized establishments are 28 per cent more
likely to have a noncontributory welfare plan than nonunionized where t is
96
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establishments, following the argument presented in the theoreti-
cal section.
It is difficult to find a rationale for the lower income elasticity of
contributory as compared to noncontributory plans among union-
ized groups, since the theory does not predict that unionized groups
will have contributory plans. A somewhat plausible argument
can be suggested for the nonunionized group. In this case the
income elasticity of demand for premiums in the contributory
subsample is larger than in the noncontributory subsample. In
nonunionized establishments the employer must respond to vary-
ing preferences, not just to the median individual. If a noncon-
tributory plan is chosen, then the employer must be careful not to
provide too much in the way of benefits relative to pay, because no
one can opt out. In the contributory case, however, the employer
has much more freedom to vary benefits since individuals may opt
out. The level of benefits will be more responsive to income in the
contributory case than in the noncontributory case.
7.ILLUSTRATIVE CALCULATIONS OF PRICE
AND INCOME ELASTICITIES OF DEMAND FOR
INSURANCE
Theelasticity estimates of the preceding section are only estimates
of the response of gross premiums to income and group size. To
estimate the parameters of the demand for insurance, we need to
introduce some additional information.
Assume that insurance is sold at a constant priceper unit of
coverage. Then the elasticity of premiums with respect to the size
of the group, s, can be defined as:
(12) = +
whereis the price elasticity of demand and isthe elasticity
of price with respect to the size of the group (i.e., a measure of the
rate at which changes in group size reduce the premium). Clearly,
to estimate 71k4',oneneeds to know
Similarly,the net (of tax advantages) premium * can be defined
as:
(13)ff=(1 —t)A(s)kE(x)
where t is the marginal income tax rate, A is the loading (a function
97 Group Health Insurance as a Local Public Goodof group size), and E (x) is expected medical expenses. The elastic- APPENDIX1
ity of gross premiums with respect to income is therefore: TABLE1
(14) 7uini= + +7)ky
whereis the income elasticity of marginal tax rates and T1E(x)y
the income elasticity of demand for medical care. To estimate'tlky,
onemust have estimates of the other elasticities. This formulation
ignores the effect that increased losses arising from increased
income might have on the level of coverage chosen.
We use some estimates of the missing elasticities that, although
not precise, should give some idea of the magnitudes involved. A
schedule of group health premium discounts with size, presented
in Dickerson (1968), has an elasticity of loading with respect to firm
size of approximately —0.031. If the elasticity of premiums with re-
spect to size is 0.03, the price elasticity is approximately —2.0. If the Reference group average loading is about 0.2, this yields an estimate of the elasticity
with respect to loading of approximately —0.33.
Theincome elasticity of marginal income tax rates, at the average
income in our sample, is approximately 0.07. Feldstein (1973) has
estimated the income-elasticity of demand for medical care to be
0.54. Using a price elasticity estimate of 2.0 and our income TABLE2 SIC
elasticityestimate of 0.64, and ignoring the payroll tax, one
obtainsan income elasticity of demand for insurance of0.04. Reference group:
This very low estimate is consistent with Feldstein's finding, in
cross-sectional state-aggregated data, of no pure effect of income on
the demand for health insurance. However, there is a positive
income elasticity of demand for unionized groups, whereas the
elasticity for nonunionized groups is negative, although small.
8.CONCLUSION
Thetheory developed in this paper has some important implica-
tions for empirical work, although the possibility of the nonexis-.
tence of equilibrium raises difficulties. The data available did not
permit direct testing of all of these implications. What tests we were
able to perform confirm the predictions of the theory, in that they
show that unions and employers behave differently in their choice
of group insurance levels. Data on the distribution of firm charac-
teristics will be necessary for more direct empirical testing.
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APPENDIX 1
TABLE 1Fringe Benefit Plan Binary Variables
HOLCno health plan, contributory life insurance plan
HOLNno health plan, noncontributory life insurance
plan
HCLOcontributory health plan, no life insurance plan
HCLCcontributory health plan, contributory life
insurance plan
HCLNcontributory health plan, noncontributoty life
insurance plan
HNLOnoncontributory health plan, no life insurance
plan
HNLCnoncontributory health plan, contributory life
insurance plan
HNLNnoncontributory health plan, noncontributory
life insurance plan
Reference group:
TABLE 2 SIC Code Binary Variables
Reference group: 1Construction, special trade contractors
2Agricultural services, forestry, fishing
3Mining












































26Electric, gas, and sanitary services
27Wholesale trade
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100 Goldstein and Pauly
Reference group:24Local and interurban transportation, other transporta-
28Retail building, retail general merchandise apparel,
furniture
29Retail food






Variable Coefficient Standard Error

























































IND. 14 —89.7814 150.8334
IND. 15 71.6416 43.1703
IND. 16 187.7605 27.0916
IND. 17 165.4972 42.8687
IND. 18 138.7482 33.6760
IND. 19 31.6347 53.3250
IND. 20 70.4452 47.0344




IND. 26 —76.6522 149.8810
IND. 27 16.8561 41.5541
IND. 28 —40. 1884 48.3839
IND. 29 11.7315 56.8736
IND.30 27.9368 66.1347
IND. 31 —7.7350 42.9379
IND.32 —17.0243 49.1655





"Significant at the 1 per cent level of significance using a one-tailed test.
Significant at the 5 per cent level of significance using a one-tailed test.
'Significant at the 10 per cent level of significance using a one-tailed test.
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Variable Coefficient StandardError
HNLC -110.5753 79.0453 .
IND. 3 370.4995 42.4451
IND.4 —18.9182 53.0407
IND. 5 116.5961 225.7463
IND. 6 36.4339 42.4022
IND. 7 —15.4366 59.8475
IND. 8 61.0942 84.5065
IND. 9 • 8.4334 109.7024
IND. 10 94.577 1 68.5686
IND. 11 —172.1880 114.5963
IND. 12 —133.8114 112.2699
IND. 13 197.8371 92. 1663
IND. 14 39.9854 162.0159
IND. 15 95.8523 73. 1455
IND. 16 192.3440 38.0959
IND. 17 • 209.6347 67.2601
IND. 18 176.8147 51.5436
IND. 19 38.8871 91.1344
IND. 20 74.0772 67.7042
IND. 21 30.1787 157.2047
IND. 22 —40.2380 92.3222
IND. 24 36.1261 92.1104
IND. 25 6.8042 64.3555
IND. 27 49.8022 74.0300
IND. 28 —123.5410 100.0552
IND. 29 71.5459 78.4637
IND. 30 115.7510 217.5840
IND.31 —34.0095 5126.8290
IND. 32 —14.0974 127.1777





"Significant at the 1 per cent level of significance using a one-tailed test.
"Significant at the 5 per cent level of significance using a one-tailed test.
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Variable Coefficient Standard Error
Pay .4152 x .3879 x10-2




IND. 4 —16.2282 59.8149
IND. 6 32.8301 54.5310
IND. 7 77.9837 80.2042
IND. 8 98.8492 105.3201
IND. 9 67.3969 134.2085
IND. 10 150.3697 96.8831
IND. 11 —165.6497 231.1611
IND. 12 —147.7895 163.9522
IND. 13 215.7386 119.4212
IND. 15 153.5582 90.7415
IND. 16 203.6861 44.0708
IND. 17 261.0186 83.3650
IND. 18 220.3621 62.9921
IND. 19 53.9260 117.5788
IND. 20 61.9820 94.4213
IND. 21 101.2534 231.3503
IND. 22 —50.5028 134.2346
IND. 24 —100.4000 231.9547
IND. 25 —53.2847 98.7247
IND.27 27.1488 88.5110
IND. 28 —114.9369 134.3569
IND. 29 135.5957 104.5338
IND. 30 123.6867 232.5082
IND. 31 —49,0194 165.0196
IND. 32 —21.7028 164.7800
































































Variable Coefficient Standard Error
Pay .2216 x 10' .8539 x
Employ —.3030 x .1593 x 10'
South 124.6589 72.7539
Office —111.9219 91.8847
IND. 4 —225.0749 154.0686 .
IND. 6 114.3624 91.7063
IND. 7 —284.3558 123.0155
IND. 8 —4.1756 128.9841
IND. 10 —.5782 115.0574
IND. 11 —93. 1873 182.7301
IND. 12 —69.6146 128.0180
IND. 13 156.6614 112.7175
IND. 14 —137.3590 156.2430
IND. 16 154.5355 72.6874
IND. 17 94.8389 115.2763
IND. 18 103.7329 168.0169
IND. 19 —62.9834 157.3418
IND. 20 189.665 1 169.7042
IND. 21 .1941 163.0831
IND. 24 —50.9480 95.0793
IND. 25 204.7270 175.5142
IND. 29 —107.7528 175.4910








































































































































































IND. 5 232.1925 185.4734
IND. 6 125.2553 57.5479
IND. 7 29.3740 74. 1326
IND. 9 182.3184 132.2361
IND. 10 55.4584 110.8921
IND. 11 —316.7350 193.4660
IND. 12 76.3260 133.3111
IND. 13 251.2017 117.8779
IND. 15 133.0822 70.4645
IND. 16 184.0137 45.2669
IND. 17 131. 1661 79.0090
IND. 18 211.3406 77.8495
IND. 19 1.3106 96.0196
IND. 20 160.8269 96.1539
IND. 22 63.2844 95.0369
IND. 25 95.7776 94.9226
IND. 26 —36.3840 186.9200
IND. 27 —37.3047 86.6681
IND. 28 —34.7703 77.3517
IND. 29 67.2898 132.4986
IND. 30 24.7555 96.1113
IND. 31 82.3387 68.8227

















Employ —2.4995 x 1.6441 X
Union .2835 3.8577 X
Office —.1679 3.9066 x
IND. 3 —9.8381 x 5.9778 x
IND. 4 7.2523 x 7.5004 )


























































Variable Coefficient Standard Error
IND.5 —.3149 .2460
IND. 6 —9.8988 x10-2 5.8525 x10-2
IND. 7 —7.2216 x 7.2542 x10-2
IND. 8 .1385 .1198
IND.9 .1098 .1431
IND. 10 —.1328 9.1344 x
IND. •11 —8.3941 x 10-2 .1435
IND. 12 —2.2569 x10-2 .1371
IND. 13 —4.7230 x10-2 .1206
IND. 14 —.3088 .3014
IND. 15 —.2239 8.5211 x 10-2
IND. 16 —8.8429 x10-2 5.3201 x10-2
IND. 17 —1.7157 x10-2 8.4889 x
IND. 18 6.6508 x 10-2 6.4383 x 10-2
IND. 19 —.1595 .1056
IND. 20 —8.1747 x10-2 9.3898 x 10-2
IND. 21 —4.4670 x10-2 .2471
IND.22 —.2000 . .1085
IND.24 —.1204 .1359
INp. 25 —2.2485 x 8.6189 x 10-2
IND. 26 —.1184 .3022
IND. 27 9.9731 x10-2 8.2196 x 10-2
IND. 28 —.1388 9.6017 x10-2
IND. 29 —4.0330 x10-2 .1128
IND.30 —.2500 .1316
IND. 31 —.1293 8.4508 x10-2
IND. 32 8.2696 x 10_2 9.6228 x 10-2
IND. 33 1.0251 x 10-2 5.8155 x 10-2






1.An illustrative schedule of the variation in premiums with group size is
presented in 0. D. Dickerson, Health Insurance, 3rd ed. (Homewood, Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, 1968), p. 592. This schedule indicates that group size
economies would be exhausted at a group size of about 500 employees,
assuming a monthly premium per employee family of $50.
108 Goldstein and Pauly2.This assumes that small firms are more efficient in the production of outputs in
particular industries.
3.Moral hazard is obviously ignored here.
4.In a more general context, Rothschild and Stiglitz have shown that no
equilibrium may exist in cases of adverse selection. See M. Rothschild and
J. Stiglitz, "Equilibrium in Insurance Markets: The Economics of Imperfect
Information," unpublished manuscript, Yale University, 1973.
5.In equilibrium, the number of firms will be such that no firm will have a work
force homogeneous with respect to health insurance preferences or risk of
illness, in other words, the distribution of preferences and/or risk over the
labor force is such that the frequency of workers at any preference or risk level
is insufficient to permit a firm to operate profitably with only these workers.
There is then some minimal size needed to operate profitably, and this requires
attracting more workers than there are at any given preference or risk level.
6.These demand curves make quantity of insurance a function of gross (of tax
savings) price. In part, the differences in demands at a given gross price could
be caused by differential tax advantages that cause net prices to differ.
7.Here again, marginal utilities depend in part on tax savings. Thus, u( is not
equal to but also includes a utility valuation of the reduction in taxes
which occurs when k increases and taxable (money) income declines.
8.The critical assumption is that an employer can separate workers of different
types. He can then pay each group a different money wage to ensure that, given
the level of health insurance, each group is at the margin (Equation (4)). if it is
too costly to separate all types of workers, then it is certainly possible that some
workers will not be at the margin, and yet will still be better off in their job than
in alternatives currently available for a range of values of health insurance
benefits. The employer will not need to take their preferences into account in
choosing the level of health insurance. Consequently, there is no presumption
that such a situation will be Pareto optimal.
9.The earlier assumption about the incidence of fringe benefits falling wholly on
employees is actually a consequence of the free entry and mobility assump-
tions. With free entry of firms, if one employer tries to shift more than the cost
of the fringe benefits onto his workers, some potential employer can offer a
slightly higher wage, attracting all the employees of the former and still being
able to operate profitably.
10.For a description of this data, see Employee Compensation in the Private
Nonfarm Economy, 1970, Washington, D.C., 1973.
11.The four-digit SIC code for each establishment is given. The regional code
takes on four values, for Northeast, South, North Central, and West.
12.This procedure obviously sacrifices some observations. There will be fIrms in
which the office and nonoffice workers have the same type of plan, but in
which the plans are separate. Our procedure is a conservative one that cuts the
sample from almost 7,000 observations to just over 1,600 observations.
Moreover, if union-wide contracts cover more than one firm, again we will have
imprecise measurement of group characteristics. Use of the SIC code may help
to control this. Our procedure also eliminates all groups providing no insurance
whereas a more reasonable procedure would involve using a Tobit form of
analysis on all observations.
13.F-tests indicated that both the plan classification and the industry classifica-
tions added significantly to the explanation of premiums at the 1 per cent level.
14.The elasticity of premiums with respect to the size of the group in Table 1 is



































109 Group Health Insurance as a Local Public GoodI
per cent of the workers are office workers; in the nonunionized subsample, 71 moreimportant,
percent areofficeworkers. that arein prin
15.The sets of coefficients calculated using the nonunion subsample are statisti- changefrom r
callysignificantly different from each other at the 1 per cent level. In the union developingthe
case,the two sets are not significantly different at the 10 per cent level. mentswill be
16.Use of a binary dependent variable makes the assumption of homoscedasticity particularto th
untenable. The OLS estimator is unbiased, but the estimates of the standard equilibrium am








1.Bergstrom, Theodore, and Robert Goodman, "Private Demands for Public 3.there is n
Goods,"American Economic Review, 63 (June 1973), pp. 280—296. benefit p
2.Borcherding, Thomas A., and Robert Deacon, "The Demand for the Services of Noticethat th
Non-FederalGovernments," American Review, 62 (December
1972), pp. 891—901. choosetheirw
3.Feldstein, Martin, "The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance," Journal of This requiremi
PoliticalEconomy, 81 (March—April 1973), pp. 251—280. Let mecorn
4.
_____
, andElizabeth Allison, "Tax Subsidies of Private Health Insurance." In relevantto th
TheEconomics of Federal SubsidyPrograms,A Compendium of Papers economyare
Submittedto the Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy of Govern- providepublii
mentof the Joint Economic Committee, Part 8—-Selected Subsidies, July their respectiv
29, 1974 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974). overtheirpriv;
5.Lester, R. A., "Benefits as a Preferred Form of Compensation," Southern by their jurist
EconomicJournal, 34 (April 1967), pp. 488—495. simplicity
6.Phelps, Charles, "The Demand for Health Insurance," R—1054—OEO, The Rand whose rate va Corporation, July, 1973. Tk
7.Rice, Robert D., "Skill, Earnings, and the Growth of Wage Supplements," epa ItO








3 COMMENTS The other
equilibrium,"
setofluriSdic Donald Richter make everyol
Universityof Rochester Condition
somewhatdi
Professors Goldstein and Pauly should be complimented on their effortto simply mean
construct a theoryofthecollectivepurchase of insurance-type benefits, and otherattaifla


























more important, on deriving some very interesting implications of their theory
that are in principle subject to empirical test. Their paper is a refreshing
change from much other empirical work in that they take some care in
developing the theory that underlies their empirical hypotheses. My com-
ments will be confined primarily to the theoretical part of their paper, in
particular to the two general types of equilibria discussed—employer-choice
equilibrium and union-choice equilibrium.
I will first discuss the concept of employer-choice equilibrium. In order to
facilitate comparison with analogous equilibrium concepts in the theory of
public goods, and because the precise requirements of employer-choice
equilibrium were a bit obscure to me from reading the paper, I will restate its
definition in the following terms. An employer-choice equilibrium is a set of
employee groups, each with a wage-fringe benefit package, such that:
1.producers maximize profits;
2. no employee wishes to switch to another group;
3. there is no other conceivable set of groups and associated wage-fringe
benefit packages that could make all employees better off.
Notice that the authors introduce condition (3) by saying that employers
choose their wage-fringe benefit package so as to minimize their labor cost.
This requirement implies that the equilibrium is Pareto optimal.
Let me compare this equilibrium concept with two equilibrium concepts
relevant to the theory of value with public goods. The consumers of the
economy are partitioned into a set of governmental jurisdictions, which
provide public goods to their residents and collect taxes so as to balance
their respective budgets. The consumers are assumed to maximize their utility
over their private goods bundles, given the amounts of public goods provided
by their jurisdictions and subject to their after-tax budget constraint. For
simplicity, assume that each jurisdiction can levy a proportional wealth tax,
whose rate varies across jurisdictions.
The partition of consumers into jurisdictions and the provisions of public
and private goods, the tax rates, and private goods prices are endogenous and
determined by the following equilibrium concepts. The first, which I will refer
to as a "local mobility equilibrium," requires that the supply and demand for
private goods be equated such that:
1'. producers maximize profits;
2'. no consumer wishes to move to another existing jurisdiction;
3'. for any of the existing jurisdictions, there is no alternative provision of
public goods and taxes to pay for them which can make everyone better
off.
The other equilibrium concept, which Iwill refer to as a "global mobility
equilibrium," replaces (3') with the following condition there is no other
set of jurisdictions and associated public goods provisions and taxes that will
make everyone better off.
Condition (3') amounts to what Elliclcson (1973) has referred to (in a
somewhat different context) as Pareto optimality relative to a partition.It
simply means that the equilibrium is Pareto optimal when compared to all
other attainable allocations consistent with the endogenously determined
111 Group Health Insurance as a Local Public Goodpartition. Condition (3") is a much stronger condition, which implies (3') but
also requires that there be no Pareto superior allocation among the class of
' Vic
attainable allocations corresponding to all conceivable partitions of the Columbia University
consumers, not just the equilibrium one.
The global mobility equilibrium is the direct analogue of the Goldstein- I have only a fE
Pauly' employer-choice equilibrium. It is an extremely strong equilibrium that use of medic
is unlikely to exist under general conditions. On the other hand, the local somewhat les
mobility equilibrium can,Ithink, be shown to exist under rather general group insuran
conditions. It also seems like an interesting equilibrium concept in the public medical exarr
goods context. In particular, it seems reasonable that consumers will shop generally exp
around among the various existing jurisdictions, comparing public goods- selected out
tax packages, but there does not seem to be a compelling decentralized basis. They
mechanism that would lead to a global Pareto optimum. This suggests that selection, in
perhaps the authors should use the analogue of the local mobility equilibrium in the plan of
in their arguments. The advantage is that their equilibrium is then likely to will be put in
exist. The disadvantage is that one loses the interpretation that sees the whether nonc
employer as choosing the wage-fringe benefit package with art eye to among jobs
minimizing labor cost tolerable leve
The other equilibrium concept discussed in the paper—the union-choice prior to emplo
equilibrium—would correspond in the public goods context to determining means of prot
the amount of public goods in each jurisdiction according to the median they are
voter's preferences, Again, existence islikely to be a problem. Models claims based
demonstrating the existence of a general economic equilibrium wherein physically
public goods provisions are determined by some (highly simplified) type of likelyto leave
political behavior are precious few. training and
Let me close by pointing out that it is very unfortunate that the empirical Another po
implications that really draw on the richness of the authors' model are 011 the exten
precisely the ones that the authors have not been able to test because of data according wi
limitations. Future relaxation of these data limitations would be very interest- unrealistic
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112 Goldstein and Pauly 113 GroI have only a few rather peripheral remarks to add to this paper. One is that the
use of medical examinations as an exclusionary device islikely to be
somewhat less important than might at first appear. One of the motives for
group insurance is precisely the savings in underwriting costs, of which the
medical examination is an important element. Underwriters of group plans
generally expect to encounter a certain proportion of risks that would be
selected out or subjected to higher premiums if insured on an individual
basis. They protect themselves against an undue amount of adverse
selection, in the case of contributory optional plans, by requiring the inclusion
in the plan of a certain minimum proportion of the eligible risks before the plan
will be put into effect. In the case of plans with compulsory participation,
whether noncontributory or otherwise, the limited elasticity of substitution
among jobs will ordinarily be sufficient to limit the inclusion of bad risks to a
tolerable level. To be sure, employers often require a medical examination
prior to employment, but it is not clear to what extent such examinations are a
means of protecting insurance programs against bad risks and to what extent
they are intended to protect the employer from workmen's compensation
claims based on preexisting conditions, or to ensure that the employee will be
physically capable of performing the required work, or to weed out employees
likely to leave after too short a period to yield a return on their initial on-the-job
training and recruitment costs.
Another point is that to treat a union as a mechanism for making decisions
on the extent of insurance according to majority rule, with the decision
according with the preferences of the median "voter," is,Ithink, a grossly
unrealistic approach. At best the union leadership is elected on the basis of a
large number of issues, the most salient of which is probably the degree of
general militancy and skill evinced in dealing with employers; and the
particular issue of how much insurance to include in the wage package would
be considered only in conjunction with a large number of other matters, In the
union's decision on the package to bargain for, there would be considerable
scope for weighing intensity of individual preferences concerning the relative
amounts of insurance against other elements of the package, so that the
median voter rule would be inapplicable. In practice, rather than being an
ideal democracy, the typical union has a leadership that is to a large extent
self-perpetuating and subject to serious challenge only under very unusual
circumstances. Such a leadership would tend to make decisions that are fairly
strongly biased toward the preferences of the senior members with the longest
tenure, which in turnislikely to be a preference for larger amounts of
insurance, since the older members are likely to have the higher risk. This is to
me a more persuasive explanation of the statistical findings that premiums are
higher if unions exist.
Finally, it is perhaps worth mentioning that among the industry coefficients
the only ones that appear to have substantial statistical significance levels are
William Vickrey
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113 Group Health Insurance as a Local Public Goodthose for mining, primary metal, fabricated metal, and machinery, except
electrical, all of which have positive coefficients with t ratios ranging from
about 4 to 8. There may be some significance to the fact that only industries in
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